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COPYRIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-VISUAL
AND AURAL ASPECTS OF VIDEOGAMES ARE PROPERLY COPY-
RIGHTABLE MATERIAL. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, I the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the visual
2 and aural 3
aspects of videogames4 are copyrightable material under the Copy-
right Act of 1976.' Stern is a model study in the dynamic elasticity
of American jurisprudence. The material presented to the court for
a ruling on its copyrightability represented the state-of-the-art in
highly technological leisure products. The court was faced with a
sequence of audiovisual images, produced by printed circuit boards
and within which a human competitor was enabled to participate.
The court was challenged to apply a body of statutes and case law
that primarily grew out of motion pictures, phonograph records and
television to an entirely new technological advancement. Stern is
one case from a recent line6 of similar cases that has considered the
copyrightability of audiovisual materials and the scope of such
copyrights.
"Scramble" 7 was the videogame at issue in Stern. A Japanese
company, Konami Industry Co., developed Scramble in late 1980
1. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. The "visual aspects" of a videogame are the images that appear on a cathode ray tube
while the game is in operation.
3. The "aural aspects" of a videogame are the auditory sensations; ie., music and simu-
lated action that parallel the visual activity.
4. A videogame is a relatively simple computer system composed of printed circuit
boards, called "read-only-memories" (ROMs), a cathode ray tube and a speaker. The ROMs
predetermine the sequence of activity, and the player participates, within that sequence, by
means of hand controls. A large cabinet houses the entire system.
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982); Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F.
Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.
1981); Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,328 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3,
1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Artic International, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.
1983).
7. The court of appeals in Stern detailed the visual and aural aspects of Scramble as
follows:
[T]he video screen displays a spaceship moving horizontally through six different
scenes in which obstacles are encountered. With each scene the player faces increas-
ing difficulty in traversing the course and scoring points. . . . The player controls
the altitude and speed of the spaceship, decides when to release the ship's supply of
and published it in Japan on January 8, 1981. Stern became aware
of Konami's development and obtained an exclusive sub-license to
market Scramble in North and South America. On March 17, 1981,
Stern initiated its marketing campaign.
The provisions of the copyright registration section of the Copy-
right Act8 require the applicant to submit two copies of the work to
the Copyright Office. Konami submitted videotapes of Scramble as
it appears and sounds in two of its operational modes.9 On April 14,
1981, the Copyright Office issued a Certificate of Copyright Regis-
tration for Scramble.
Between December 1, 1980 and March 17, 1981, the defendant,
Omni Video Games, Inc.,' renamed and sold five of its older vide-
ogames under the new commercial appellation "Scramble."" Soon
after Stem first marketed its Scramble, Omni commenced marketing
a new videogame, similarly entitled "Scramble," which was "virtu-
ally identical in both sight and sound"' 2 to Stern's Scramble.
Stem, alleging a copyright violation, brought this action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 3
and sought a preliminary injunction' 4 to prevent Omni from further
bombs, and fires lasers that can destroy attacking missiles and aircraft. . . . The
scenes are in color, and the action is accompanied by battlefield sounds.
669 F.2d at 853-54.
8. The copyright registration provisions are set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1976).
9. Id. § 408(c)(1) provides, in part, as follows: "The regulations may require or permit,
for particular classes, the deposit of identifying material instead of copies or pho-
norecords .. " See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2) (1981). See also Williams Electronics, Inc. v.
Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982), in which the court stated: "The
deposit of videotapes as a satisfactory method of complying with the statutory deposit require-
ments has been universally accepted in cases considering copyrights for the audiovisual work
displayed in these videogames."
10. The other defendants were Omni's distributor and two of Omni's officers.
11. A secondary legal issue also was a part of this action. Omni claimed a trademark
right to the name "Scramble" because Omni commercially used the name prior to Stem's
commercial use of it.
While it is true that the first party to make a commercial use of a trademark has a claim to
its exclusive ownership, see 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MO-
NOPOLIES § 76.2(c) (3d ed. 1969), the claim is by no means absolute. The use of the trademark
must be "bona fide." See Phillips v. Hudnut, 263 F. 643, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Blue Bell, Inc.
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that "[mere adoption of a mark
without bona fide use, in an attempt to reserve it for the future, will not create trademark
rights"). Regarding Omni's allegedly preemptive use of the trademark "Scramble," the court
of appeals noted, "The District Court was entitled to conclude that Omni was simply attaching
a secondary label in a bad faith attempt to reserve a mark." 669 F.2d at 857.
12. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 854-55.
13. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
14. The district court in Stern noted, "Preliminary injunctive relief is the only effective
means of protecting a copyright in a videogame since the life span of a successful game is
merely six months." 523 F. Supp. at 638.
The determination that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate initial remedy must be
based upon a number of carefully resolved considerations, including the following: First, the
moving party must show a likelihood of success on the merits on its case. See, e.g., Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scorecard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
Second, the moving party must show that, in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief, it
will suffer irreparable injury. See, e.g., Kontes Glass Co. v. Lab Glass, Inc., 373 F.2d 319, 329-
selling its Scramble. The district court granted Stem a preliminary
injunction, 5 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed that ruling.
16
To sustain an action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff is
required to satisfy two criteria. First, the plaintiff must establish that
it possesses a valid copyright.' 7 Second, the plaintiff must show
"copying" by the defendant.' 8 The first of these burdens often is met
by the mere possession of a Certificate of Copyright Registration.
Possession of a certificate is prima facie evidence of its validity.' 9
Any attempt to disclaim the validity of a copyright must defeat this
presumption. One challenging the validity must establish that the
copyrighted material failed to satisfy the requirements of the Copy-
right Act.2°
31 (3d Cir. 1967). Last, a court must resolve any equitable considerations-for example, bal-
ance the hardships that the granting of, or the refusal to grant, such relief would impose upon
the parties and the effect such relief would have on any particular public interests. See, e.g.,
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Klitzner Industries, Inc. v. H.K. James & Co., 535 F.
Supp. 1249, 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Some courts have permitted a presumption of irreparable injury to follow a showing of
likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Tran-
script Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Klitzner, 535 F.
Supp. at 1258-59. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A] (1982) (for
a general discussion of the role of preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement actions)
(hereinafter cited as 3 M. NIMMERI.
15. 523 F. Supp. at 639.
16. 669 F.2d at 857.
17. Nimmer disassembles the ownership of a copyright into five "constituent parts" as
follows:
(1) Originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject matter; (3) citizen-
ship status of the author such as to permit a claim of copyright; (4) compliance with
applicable statutory formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not the author) a transfer of
right or other relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as to constitute the
plaintiff the valid copyright claimant.
3 M. NiMMER, supra note 14, § 13.01[A].
18. Id. § 13.01. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977); Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Testa v. Janssen, 482 F.
Supp. 198, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976) provides in part as follows: "In any judicial proceedings
the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the
work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate." See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.01[A]. The certificate is
prima facie evidence of the five "constituent parts" of copyright ownership. See supra note 17.
20. The general provisions outlining the requirements which specific material must sat-
isfy to obtain a copyright are contained in 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). That section reads in perti-
nent part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories:
(1) literary works ...
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works . ...
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
Games traditionally have been extended only limited copyright
protection, 2' and the copyright law's historical treatment of games
provides little guidance in determining the copyrightability of mate-
rial as sophisticated as a videogame's audiovisual display. Thus,
thorough analysis must consider the specific language of the Copy-
right Act, the relevant case law,22 and the individual elements of the
work for which a copyright is sought.
Clearly, a videogame's underlying computer program (ROM),
23
which determines the audiovisual display projected onto the cathode
ray tube, is copyrightable as a "literary work."' 24  Unfortunately,
such a copyright provides only a weak safeguard against potential
pirating of the manifested audiovisual display.25 Konami endeav-
ored instead to copyright the display itself as an "audiovisual
work."26 The few courts that have considered the issue uniformly
have ruled that the sights and sounds of videogames are within the
Copyright Act's definition of "audiovisual works. '27  Therefore, if a
defendant is to succeed in disclaiming the validity of a videogame's
copyright, the defendant's assault must be on a different flank.
In Stern, Omni contended that the audiovisual features of
Stem's Scramble failed to satisfy the statutorily imposed "original-
ity" and "fixed . ..medium" requirements.28 In its "originality"
argument, Omni alleged that the visual and aural aspects of Scram-
21. Nimmer comments, "It is true that no copyright may be obtained in the system or
manner of playing a game or in engaging in any other sporting or like activity. However, some
limited copyright protection is nevertheless available in connection with games." 1 M. NiM-
MER, supra note 14, § 12.18[H][31[a]. For cases considering the copyrightability of traditional
games see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979), cerl.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct. 1805 (1983); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp.,
150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
22. Copyright law, by its very nature, is not a law of precedents. When a new work seeks
a copyright, it must be "original." Therefore, any preceding authority often will touch upon a
work at issue in only very general ways. The copyrightability of a videogame's audiovisual
display is a glaring example of this. The work is highly innovative, and, hence, truly relevant
case law is meager.
23. See supra note 4.
24. See supra note 20. The Copyright Act defines "literary works" as "works, other than
audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indi-
cia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1976). This statutory definition is broad enough to include computer programs. I M. NiM-
MER, supra note 14, § 2.04[c]. See Tandy corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
25. Stem Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 855.
26. See supra note 20. The Copyright Act defines "audiovisual works" as
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Stern Electronics, Inc. v.
Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. at 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
28. See supra note 20.
ble were mere byproducts of the determinative computer program
and that the audiovisual images, therefore, were not "original"
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.29 Omni sought to limit
Scramble's copyrightability to its computer program, which Omni
declared was Scramble's only "original" component.3" The Copy-
right Act does not specifically define "originality"; a composite
sketch of that term may be drawn from relevant case law. "Original-
ity" does not seem to require that the material for which a copyright
is sought be "new";3  it only requires that the material be the prod-
uct of the registrant.32 There must be an element of independent
creation.33 Omni thus sought to narrow significantly a rather broad
definition to exclude therefrom the secondary, manifest phase in a
chain of production.
The court of appeals likened a videogame's particular system of
reproduction to the recording of a musical composition.34 An audio-
tape captures and reproduces a musical composition, but does not
strip the composition of copyrightability. Similarly, a printed circuit
board captures and reproduces an audiovisual display, but does not
strip the display of copyrightability.35
Omni further attempted to repudiate Scramble's "originality"
by pointing to its participatory nature. Omni argued as follows: If a
player can participate in and alter the sequence of the audiovisual
activity, then each play of the game is unique and, hence, not copy-
rightable.36 Based upon its ocular examination of the work, the
court of appeals ruled that, despite these variations, "many aspects
of the sights and the sequence of their appearance remain constant
during each play of the game."'37 The court proceeded to consider
the consistency of the'aural repetitions 38 and ultimately held that
"originality" was not sacrificed to human participation.39
29. Id.
30. 669 F.2d at 856. Omni asserted a similar contention in the district court. 523 F.
Supp. at 638. See also Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981),
in which the defendant argued that the original work of authorship is the computer program.
31. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. Id.
33. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tony Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. 669 F.2d at 856.
35. The court of appeals in Stern further noted that the creative process involves first the
conception of the sights and sounds of the audiovisual display and then the devising of a
means to produce and reproduce that display. The court concluded that "originality" resides
in the initial conception. Id. at 856-57. The district court responded to this same argument by
stating, "An author's work does not become any less original after he has found a means to
replicate it." 523 F. Supp. at 639.
36. 669 F.2d at 855-56.
37. Id. at 856.
38. Id.
39. The court stated that "[t]he repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights
and sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection . I.." Id.
Omni's allegation that the visual and aural aspects of Scramble
failed to satisfy the "fixed in a tangible medium of expression"4 re-
quirement of the Copyright Act also was based on Scramble's par-
ticipatory quality. Essentially, Omni's argument was that if each
play of the game is unique as a result of player participation, then
the game cannot be considered "fixed."'" This same argument sur-
faced in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,4 2 in which the
defendant argued that "Galaxian"43 was not "fixed" if the visual
images were responsive to the whims of the player." The court of
appeals in Stern dispensed with this argument simply by restating its
rebuttal to Omni's prior attack on Scramble's participatory nature.
4 5
The most common assault on videogames' satisfaction of the
"fixation" requirement might be termed the "ephemeral projection"
argument.46 This argument was articulated in Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 47 in which the defendant alleged that the work was
not "fixed" since "the games' visual displays are merely ephemeral
projections on a cathode ray tube."48 In Dirkschneider, the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska found the argu-
ment to be defective because the argument confused the copyrighted
work itself with the "medium" in which such works must be
"fixed."'49 A painting is not the canvas beneath it, and a book5" is not
the pages within it. The audiovisual displays and the determinative
computer programs in videogames are separate and distinct entities
for the purposes of copyright law. The former are "fixed" in the
latter.5 '
40. See supra note 20. The Copyright Act defines "fixed" at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) as
follows:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
41. 669 F.2d at 855-56.
42. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I11. 1981), afl'd 704 F.2d 1009 (1982).
43. "Galaxian" is the commercial name for a videogame manufactured by Midway Man-
ufacturing Company.
44. 547 F. Supp. at 1007-08.
45. 669 F.2d at 856.
46. See infra note 48.
47. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
48. Id. at 479.
49. Id. Nimmer commented on this distinction as follows: "An 'original work of author-
ship' as that phrase is used in the Copyright Act, should not be confused with the material
objects in which the work must be embodied in order to satisfy the fixation requirement." I
M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 2.03[c].
50. "A 'book' is merely a material object which may embody, and hence constitute, a
copy of a given literary work." Id.
51. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 480. See also Atari, Inc. v.
Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). The Maryland district court simi-
larly ruled that the videogame's audiovisual display was "fixed" in the underlying computer
program.
The district court in Stern appropriately considered whether
Stem's copyright was valid5 2 and whether Omni's acts amounted to
"copying" of Stem's videogame.53 The latter issue was not enter-
tained on appeal. The court of appeals accepted the district court's
ruling that the two Scrambles were "substantially similar."54 The
court of appeals specifically disclaimed the necessity of deciding
"whether a sequence of images (e.g., a spaceship shooting down an
attacking plane) might contain so little in the way of particularized
form of expression as to be only an abstract idea portrayed in
noncopyrightable form. . . ."I' The court here alluded to the statu-
tory prohibition on the copyrighting of "ideas."56 As this same court
of appeals noted in Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 57 copy-
right protection extends to the expression of an idea and not to the
idea itself.5" In Stern, the court presumably viewed this issue as a
component of the larger "copying" issue and hence as an issue of
fact 59 not requiring the court's consideration. 60
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the idea/expression-of-
idea dichotomy also can be viewed as going to the heart of the
copyrightability of specific subject matter.6 In Atari, Inc. v. Amuse-
52. 523 F. Supp. at 638-39.
53. Id. at 639. See supra note 18. Since actual proof of copying is often difficult to
obtain, most courts will allow copying to be evidenced by proof of the defendant's access to the
copyrighted work and by a showing of "substantial similarity" between the copyrighted work
and the accused work. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090,
1092 (2d Cir. 1977); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
Some courts have extended this general rule to allow a presumption that the defendant
had access to the copyrighted work to follow a showing of "substantial similarity." See Knick-
erbocker Toy Co. v. Genie Toys, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
54. 523 F. Supp. at 639. Traditionally, the heart of the determination of "substantial
similarity" has been an application of the "ordinary observer" test. Judge Learned Hand first
articulated this test when he commented that "substantial similarity" exists when "[tihe ordi-
nary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them,
and regard their asthetic appeal as the same." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). Another often applied test is to assess whether the accused
work exhibits signs of "the total concept and feel" of the copyrighted work. Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally 3 M. NIMMER,
supra note 14, § 13.03, which discusses generally what constitutes "substantial similarity."
55. 669 F.2d at 857.
56. See supra note 20.
57. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
58. 533 F.2d at 90. The concept is perhaps best illustrated in terms of the "scenes a faire"
approach to the copyrightability of literary works. "Scenes a faire" refer to "incidents, charac-
ters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensible, or at least standard, in the treat-
ment of a given topic." Alexander v. Haly, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Hence, the
thematic line of boy meets girl, boy loses girl, boy gets girl is noncopyrightable. If this same
thematic line is embellished with particularizing details, it may become copyrightable material.
59. International Luggage Registry v. Avery Products Corp. was an action based on an
alleged copyright infringement, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated, "The question of 'substantial' or 'noteworthy' similarity is one of fact and on
appeal the issue is governed by the clearly erroneous principle stated in Rule 52(a)." 541 F.2d
830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976).
60. On appeal, to a court of appeals, "[findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
61. One commentator has noted, "Originality cannot be dissociated from copyright pro-
ment World, Inc.,62 in which the game at issue was entitled "Aster-
oids," the defendant claimed that Asteroids' copyright was an
unlawful copyrighting of the idea of a participatory, audiovisual por-
trayal of a spaceship defending against an onslaught of meteors. 3
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland noted
therein that a careful analysis must include an examination of the
idea and the medium in which the idea is manifested.' The court
concluded that copyright protection does not encompass elements of
a work that are necessary by-products of the idea and medium
limitations.65
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Atari Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,
66
commented as follows: "The audio component and the concrete de-
tails of the visual presentation constitute the copyrightable expres-
sion of that game 'idea.' "67 Therefore, a videogame that lacks
particularized aural and visual details may acquire only limited
copyright protection because its expression of an idea differs little
from the idea itself.68 Materials in which the ideas and the expres-
sions of the ideas are indistinguishable are protected by copyrights
only to the extent that the materials are identically copied.69 They
consequently are virtually noncopyrightable.
The keystone purpose underlying the Copyright Act is to en-
courage new artistic endeavors.7" Stern stands as a judicial articula-
tion of that purpose. Videogame developers, manufacturers and
distributors, secure in the copyright protection afforded their games'
audiovisual displays, consequently will assume greater risks in the
research and development of similarly innovative leisure products.
The avuncular safeguarding exhibited in the Stern court's interpre-
tive application of the Copyright Act will serve to reassure all poten-
tection and infringement. For both concern the nature and measure of the right protected by
law. In determining it, the criterion adopted by the Courts stresses not newness of ideas, but
their distinctive unfoldment." Yankwick, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Properly, 11
F.R.D. 457, 458 (1952). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.




66. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 617.
68. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
69. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
70. The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writing and Discoveries. ... U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The Copyright Act of 1976 and its predecessors are the realization of that grant. "The purpose
of the Copyright Act is to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic
creation. Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C.
1981).
[Casenote by Henry M. Justi].
tial contributors of new modes of recreation that their legitimate
efforts will not go unprotected.

